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Abstract
Theoretical background: Family businesses are a specific group of enterprises in which family bonds play 
a vital role in determining the economic and noneconomic goals of the business. The subject literature em-
phasises the long-term focus of family businesses which is on continuity, futurity and perseverance. During 
the COVID-19 crisis, unique family business traits can allow these entities to access useful resources and take 
positive actions such as forging strong networking relationships, tapping into local idiosyncratic knowledge, 
exercising rapid response, having flexibility and exercising trust with caution. This suggests that family 
businesses might also react to the COVID-19 crisis in their own distinctive ways using their unique attributes.
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Purpose of the article: In this paper we will show how family businesses deal with coronavirus restric-
tions and what measures they undertook during this challenging period. The paper is organised around 
four research questions.
Research methods: This research was conducted using a sample of 167 family businesses. Primary data 
related to reactions of family businesses facing the COVID-19 crisis were collected in April and at the 
beginning of May 2020. To achieve the goals of this study, we carried out such research methods and 
procedures as fractal analyses, descriptive statistics, statistical comparison of means and subjective clas-
sification of the factors.
Main findings: For family businesses, a sudden fall in revenue was a common result of COVID-19 restrictions 
in the Polish economy. In the case of the majority of surveyed family firms, revenues fell by 44%, and in the 
next 2 to 3 months businesses expected additional decreases of 39.8%. More than 65% declared a stable level 
of employment, but more than a quarter of surveyed family firms showed an average dip in firm employment 
of 15.7% and expected further job losses at around 13.1%. To protect businesses against the negative effects of 
the pandemic, surveyed family firms undertook several ad hoc measures. We divided the analysed reactions to 
COVID into three groups: proactive, neutral and progressive. We noticed that the most common measures were 
those marked as “neutral”, or those which neither expanded nor retrenched the business in the short term. This 
observation suggests that family businesses might choose “persevering” as their first strategic response to the 
sudden crisis. We also found that “proactive” measures were undertaken in family businesses which evaluated 
their probability of survival as higher than businesses that indicated “neutral” or “defensive” reactions. In addi-
tion, we isolated statistically significant differences in family firms’ average probability of survival among the 
firms which introduced particular neutral and defensive measures and those which did not. On this basis we 
can conclude that the lower the perceived probability of survival is, the more retrenchment-oriented types of 
measures begin to be taken. Additionally, it should be mentioned that so-called anti-crisis shields implemented 
by the Polish government were assessed as inadequately supportive of business entities’ survival.
Introduction
Family firms are perceived as a unique group of enterprises in which family bonds 
play a crucial role in determining its economic and noneconomic goals (Basco, 2017; 
Węcławski & Żukowska, 2019). In the subject literature its long-term orientation is 
one of the fundamental characteristics mentioned (Cater & Justis, 2009; Chrisman, 
Chua, Pearson, & Barnett, 2012) which is reflected by continuity, future orientation 
and perseverance (Brigham, Lumpkin, Payne, & Zachary, 2014). It could be assumed 
that these values might help a business survive the crisis period and alleviate poten-
tial adverse consequences. Some works in the extant literature describe how family 
businesses operate during different kinds of economic shocks (Bauweraerts, 2013; 
Cater & Beal, 2014; Lins, Volpin, & Wagner, 2013; Minichilli, Brogi, & Calabrò, 
2015). The accumulated knowledge in this subject could be useful in analyses of 
family businesses’ reactions to the current COVID-191 pandemic. 
In this case, sudden COVID-19 restrictions were another challenge that family 
businesses had to face. We examined Polish family businesses to find out how they 
deal with these challenges and what their ad hoc reactions to the pandemic were. 
We assumed the measures they undertook would suggest which strategic response 
1  COVID-19 is described by media, practitioners and scientists as “SARS-CoV-2” or “coronavirus”.
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they decided to follow. According to Wenzel, Stanske and Lieberman (2020), during 
the coronavirus crisis four types of strategic business responses can be indicated: 
retrenchment, persevering, innovating and exit. 
The aim of this paper is to delineate how these entities deal with sudden corona-
virus restrictions and what measures they undertook during this challenging period. 
The paper is organised as follows. Firstly, building on previous works in the literature 
on family businesses by focusing on particular traits like long-term orientation, con-
tinuity, futurity and perseverance, we introduced the theoretical background on how 
family businesses operate during different kinds of economic crises. Subsequently, 
we presented an overview related to the COVID-19 crisis in Poland, stages of crisis 
development and restrictions that were implemented by the Polish government due 
to the pandemic situation. On the basis of theoretical considerations and situation 
overview, we formulated the thesis of this paper and research questions. As the next 
step, we presented the methodology, sample description and general results achieved. 
Finally, we drew conclusions and formulated generalisations. 
Literature review
Family businesses during the crisis
Family businesses are a specific group of enterprises in which family bonds 
play a vital role in determining economic and noneconomic goals (Basco, 2017; 
Węcławski & Żukowska, 2019). The subject literature emphasises its long-term ori-
entation (Cater & Justis, 2009; Chrisman et al., 2012) which demonstrates continuity, 
futurity and perseverance (Brigham et al., 2014). Nurturing these values might help 
businesses to survive the crisis and alleviate potential adverse consequences. Family 
involved in these shared businesses not only care about the future of the enterprise but 
also about the family’s ongoing reputation. This might affect its potential decisions 
connected with the solutions and tools which are used during trying economic times.
The extant subject literature describes how family businesses operate and perform 
during different kinds of economic shocks. The most convincing evidence is from the 
2008–2009 financial crisis. Lins et al. (2013) revealed that during that time publicly 
listed family businesses underperform nonfamily businesses. This situation is caused 
by underinvestment, which is an effect of the survival-oriented business strategy. 
Investments during the crisis are more reduced in family businesses in comparison 
to their non-family counterparts. As a result, they suffer more than other businesses 
during stock market downturns (Lins et al., 2013). The authors also noticed that 
investments are curtailed in family-controlled companies that were in relatively 
good financial condition prior to the pandemic. This phenomenon occurred when 
such a company is a part of a family business group, and the crisis hits any other 
company in a “holding”.
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Different results were obtained by Bauweraerts (2013) who showed that fam-
ily businesses outperform their nonfamily counterparts during the crisis. This is 
a result of their greater resilience through family involvement. The resilience itself 
can be explained by the “competitive advantage” hypothesis that was rooted in the 
resource-based view of the firm and stewardship theory (Minichilli et al., 2015). 
This approach suggests that specific family commitment to family firms can cre-
ate and develop specific, unique resources which are unobtainable for nonfamily 
businesses (Habbershon & Williams, 1999; Sirmon & Hitt, 2003). Family firms 
additionally benefit from unique motivation and support from family members. This 
support can take the form of free or loaned labour, low interest loans or additional 
capital investments (Siakas, Naaranoja, Vlachakis, & Siakas, 2014; Sirmon & Hitt, 
2003). In addition, family involvement in a business promotes flexibility which is 
an extremely important attribute during the COVID crisis (Bauweraerts, 2013). 
Thanks to less formalised structures (Songini, 2006) and greater solidarity with 
stakeholders (Berrone, Cruz, & Gomez-Mejia, 2012; Miller & Le Breton-Miller, 
2006) family businesses might seek more proactive and innovative ways to alleviate 
the consequences of sudden market and social shocks. The uniqueness of a family 
business in dealing with the critical circumstances was also well illustrated by Cater 
and Beal (2014), who studied their reactions to externally induced crises (the BP 
oil spill in 2010, for example). The authors examined family businesses in coastal 
parishes of Louisiana (USA) who were affected by the pollution resulting from 
the BP oil spill. They revealed that the unique traits of a family business become 
especially evident during a crisis: for example, strong networking relationships, 
local idiosyncratic knowledge, rapid response, flexibility and exercising trust with 
caution (Cater & Beal, 2014). This suggests that family businesses might also 
react to the COVID-19 crisis in their own distinctive ways, using their unique 
skills and abilities. 
Initial studies related to family business in the COVID-19 crisis seem to con-
firm the findings in question. Quality research conducted in five European countries 
revealed extraordinary solidarity with employees and external stakeholders, which 
are powerful tools that ensure mutual support and create a sense of solidarity while 
facing the crisis together (Kraus, Clauss, Breier, Gast, Zardini, & Tiberius, 2020). 
Exceptional treatment of employees during the crisis period was also confirmed in 
the study conducted by Floren, Berent-Braun and Bles-Temme (2020) among Dutch 
family firms. They showed that retaining employees is much more important than, 
for example, attaining a dividend payout. 
Different measures taken by family firms represent different strategic responses 
to COVID-19 crisis. According to Wenzel, Stanske and Lieberman (2020) four types 
of responses can be specified: retrenchment, persevering, innovating and exit. 
“Retrenchment” refers to reductions in costs, assets, products, product lines and 
overheads. “Persevering” means retaining the status quo and aiming to sustain the 
firm’s business activities. “Innovating” is connected with actions directed at seizing 
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opportunities and adapting business activities to a changing environment. “Exit” 
means the discontinuation of the business (Wenzel et al., 2020). 
Kraus et al. (2020) discovered that family businesses’ strategic responses are 
mainly pure perseverance or a combination of perseverance, innovation and re-
trenchment. These results suggest that the long-term orientation characteristic of 
family firms might naturally direct them to take the most moderate steps. However, 
implementing such steps requires having sufficient liquidity before the crisis and 
hoping this will be sufficient in the long term.
Situation overview: The COVID-19 crisis in Poland
The first COVID-19 confirmed infection in Poland was reported on 4 March 
2020. On 10 March, the first restrictions were introduced (e.g., cancelling mass 
events). The next day, classes in kindergartens, schools and universities were sus-
pended. On 13 March, came the decision about closing restaurants and places where 
people gather in mass groups. Further restrictions, announced on 24 March and 31 
March, were the most severe for the Polish economy, as nonessential travel was 
prohibited and hotels, rehabilitation salons, hairdressers and other beauty industry 
businesses were closed. In addition, employers were forced to ensure safe work 
conditions for their employees, including access to disinfectant liquids and social 
distancing between work stations (www.gov.pl; www.300gospodarka.pl/live/koro-
nawirus-nowe-ograniczenia-w-polsce). From this point, Polish businesses started to 
feel the effects of the so-called Great Lockdown.
In order to alleviate the adverse effects of the lockdown, the Polish government 
implemented its economy support programme as one of the pillars of the Anti-Crisis 
Shield. The first version of the Anti-Crisis Shield (Anti-Crisis Shield 1.0) in the form 
of a special legal act was published on 31 March. However, as the epidemic was 
worsening, additional solutions were required. Hence, there were subsequent legal 
acts implemented, dubbed Anti-Crisis Shield 2.0, 3.0 and so on. The summary of 
the most important solutions dedicated to the support of enterprises in each version 
of the shield is presented in Table 1.




date Chosen supporting tools for enterprises (exclusively)
Shield 1.0 31 March 2020
– co-financing of employees’ salaries subject to lockdown
– co-financing of the salaries of employees subject to reduced working hours
– flexible working hours
– standstill benefit 
– microloans up to PLN 5,000 (circa EUR 1,200)
– exemption from social insurance contributions (only for businesses which 
employ less than 10 people)
– tax solutions: suspension of collection of the extension fee, extension of the 
deadline for advance payments for payroll tax








date Chosen supporting tools for enterprises (exclusively)
Shield 2.0 16 April 2020
– exemption from social insurance contributions was extended for businesses 
which employ 10–49 people
– microloans up to PLN 5,000 (circa EUR 1,200) are dedicated also to busi-
nesses with no employees (sole traders)
– standstill benefit can be paid more than once (three times)
Shield 3.0 14 May 2020 – no need to obtain a new permit or declaration in the event of a change in the foreigner’s working conditions
Shield 4.0 19 June 2020
– obligation to take the overdue leave 
– limitation of the amount of severance pay
– co-financing for the remuneration of employees who have not been subject 
to downtime, economic downtime or reduced working time
– simplified restructuring procedure
– protection of enterprises against takeovers by foreign entities
– possibility of including contractual penalties in costs
Source: Authors’ own study based on (www.dziennikustaw.gov.pl/; www.pracodawcyrp.pl/tarcza-antykryzysowa)
Apart from presented solutions, on 29 April 2020, Polish Development Fund 
Group started Financial Shield for Enterprises Programme. The goal of this project 
was to support small, medium and large businesses financially through subventions, 
loans and capitalisations (www.pfr.pl/tarcza.html). At the end of July 2020, about 
PLN 60 billion was redistributed through the banks to companies that fulfil require-
ments for this support.
On 16 April, the initial plan for a “defrosting the economy” was presented. It 
was divided into four stages; however, the date (20 April) was given only for the first 
stage of defrosting. The first “loosing” action was to increase the maximum number 
of clients in shops. On 4 May, hotels and shopping centres were open again (the 
second stage of defrosting). From 18 May, beauticians, hairdressers and restaurants 
were open for business again albeit with special strict sanitary requirements. From 
6 June, fitness clubs, swimming pools, cinemas, theatres, amusement parks and 
massage salons were opened again. 
The described circumstances may serve as a “laboratory” for observations of 
specific family business behaviours during an unexpected crisis. The goal of this 
paper is to show how these entities deal with sudden restrictions and what measures 
they undertake during this challenging period. The study is guided by the following 
research questions:
1) How were family businesses affected by the lockdown restrictions?
2) What measures did family businesses undertake to combat the sudden crisis?
3) How does the perception of the family business’ future correspond with the 
undertaken measures?
4) How was the Anti-Crisis Shield evaluated by family businesses?
The rest of our paper was devoted to collecting answers to these research ques-
tions.
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Research methods 
The primary data were collected from 14 April 2020 to 6 May 2020 via mail survey. 
According to the presented situation overview, this was the peak period of lockdown 
restrictions (so-called Great Lockdown). The first announcements about “defrosting” 
(gradual easing of economic and social restrictions) plans were made, and the Anti-Cri-
sis Shield, in its first and second versions, was implemented (see Figure 1). 
Figure 1. COVID-19 in Poland – timeline
Source: Authors’ own study.
The list of family businesses was created by searching different media, national 
registers and by checking the family business forums, foundations, websites and so 
on. In total, there were 8,428 questionnaires sent to potential representatives of family 
businesses. A total of 272 (3.2%) business entities answered. From this group we 
isolated 202 (2.4%) family firms. As a method of narrowing down the family firms, 
we used a self-classification approach to the businesses in this group (Frishkoff, 1995; 
Zajkowski & Życzyński, 2014). This means that representatives of these businesses 
declared whether their business was a family firm or not. After the rejection of in-
completely filled questionnaires, the final sample totalled 167 (2%) family firms. It 
should be mentioned that business entities in the sample did not answer all questions, 
or in some cases they answered “not applicable”. 
Descriptive analysis of the tested sample allows us to identify the following 
characteristics. The oldest declared family firm had been in business for 92 years, 
the youngest firm was 2 years old. Average age of the firms was 23.6 years. Most 
enterprises took the form of an LLC company (50.8%), or sometimes they operated 
as general partnerships (16.9%) or sole traders (16.1%). Limited partnerships (8.1%), 
joint-stock companies (3.2%) or other forms were sporadic. The enterprises came 
from various industries. The majority represented were from the services sector 
(39.5%), the next largest group was from the industrial sector (25.8%), while the 
same percentage declared multisector engagement. There were 8.9% of businesses 
representing the trade sector. 
The majority of the surveyed enterprises (40.3%) employed from 10 to 49 em-
ployees and 38.7% employed up to 9 people. The rest (21.0%) had over 49 employees. 
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equalled PLN 37,831.19. Based on the classification adopted by the European Union 
(European Commission, 2009), medium-sized enterprises were dominant in terms 
of employment, but the majority were small-scale operations in terms of revenues.
Results
Taking into consideration this paper’s initial research questions, we extracted 
four areas of COVID-19 crisis impact on family businesses. Firstly, we asked repre-
sentatives of business entities how the crisis had affected them and how they would 
be affected in the proceeding 2 to 3 months in terms of employee and revenue sta-
bility. The figures revealed two tendencies. In the area of employment, the majority 
of businesses (73%) tried to sustain their current levels of employment, and 67.3% 
would not lay off any staff in the months to come. Slightly more than 22.1% reduced 
their employee numbers, and around 30% were planning to cut staff within a few 
months (see Table 2). Less than 5% of businesses (13 in total) declared that numbers 
of employed workers at their firms had risen or would increase in the near future.














Changes in employee numbers 
(persons) 37 122 8 22.1 73.0 4.8
Predicted changes in employee 
numbers in 2–3 months (persons) 49 111 5 29.7 67.3 3.0
Changes in revenues (percentage) 109 44 13 65.7 26.5 7.8
Predicted changes in revenues in 
2–3 months (percentage) 107 47 12 64.5 28.3 7.2
Source: Authors’ own study.
The majority of family businesses (65.7%) reported a decrease in revenue, and 
a similar percentage (64.5%) were expecting revenue to go down in two to three 
months. More than a quarter (26.5%) declared no changes in revenue, and 28.3% did 
not anticipate a fall in revenue anytime soon. Only 7.8% of surveyed family business-
es noticed a positive change in revenue, and 7.2% predicted an increase in revenue. 
On average, decreases in employment accounted for 7.8 persons, and it was 
expected that in the next few months, reductions in staff would account for 5.5 addi-
tional persons (see Table 3). In the group of family businesses that declared increases 
in employment, the relevant figure showed an average of 8.6 new hires, and these 
businesses were expecting further growth of 3.2 persons on average. 
An average fall in revenue was 44%, and the prediction for the next few months 
was a further reduction of 39.8%. These family businesses that declared increases 
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in revenue achieved a 46.8% growth rate and expected their income would increase 
by 27.7% in two to three months. 
Table 3. Average changes in employment and revenue
Performance Average decrease Average increase
Changes in employee numbers 7.8 persons 8.6 persons
Predicted changes in employee numbers 5.5 persons 3.2 persons
Changes in revenue 44.0% 46.8%
Predicted changes in revenue 39.8% 27.7%
Source: Authors’ own study.
The next phase of the research was devoted to identifying which measures (reac-
tions) were undertaken by family businesses as a response to COVID-19 crisis restric-
tions. We referred to them as ad hoc short-term reactions. We classified these measures 
(reactions) into three groups: proactive, neutral and defensive. Proactive responses are 
focused on boosting family business operational processes during the COVID-19 crisis. 
Neutral responses do not require significant reorganisation of business operational 
processes, or changes can be implemented gradually according to accessible formal 
and legal requirements. Defensive reactions refer to active reductions to the current 
financial and economic burden of the business. This division was illustrated in Figure 2.
Figure 2. Division of businesses’ ad hoc reaction to the COVID-19 crisis
Source: Authors’ own study.
Reactions
Proactive Neutral Defensive
Employees have been 
switched to remote work
Company engaged in social 
activities
Additional working capital 
loan has been taken out
E-commerce trade has been 
implemented
Business profile of the 
enterprise has been changed
Employees have been 
switched to paid holiday
Investments have been 
suspended
Bonuses have not been paid
Less profitable areas of 
activity have been liquidated
Payment terms of liabilities 
have been extended
Employees have been 
switched to non-paid holiday
Wages have been reduced
Leasing handling has been 
suspended
Repayment of loans has been 
suspended
Less important production 
assets have been sold
Real estates have been sold 
(are sold)
Liquid financial "reserves" 
have been tapped
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An analysis of response structures revealed which percentage of family business-
es implemented particular measures. Overall, 70% of business entities suspended 
investments, 53.3% switched employees to remote work and 52.4% were forced to 
access liquid financial “reserves” (see Table 4).
Table 4. Ad hoc reactions of family businesses facing the COVID-19 crisis
Reactions/actions/solutions No (N) No (%) yes (N) yes (%) Kind of activity
Investments have been suspended 42 30.00 98 70.0 Neutral
Employees have been switched to remote work 56 46.67 64 53.3 Proactive
Liquid financial “reserves” have been tapped 60 47.62 66 52.4 Proactive/Neutral
Employees have been switched to paid holiday 72 50.35 71 49.7 Neutral
Bonuses have not been paid 70 57.85 51 42.1 Neutral
Payment terms of liabilities have been extended 82 58.99 57 41.0 Defensive
E-commerce trade has been implemented 69 61.06 44 38.9 Proactive
Company engaged in social activities 93 67.39 45 32.6 Proactive
Less profitable areas of activity have been liquidated 80 69.57 35 30.4 Defensive
Wages have been reduced 99 69.72 43 30.3 Defensive
Repayment of loans has been suspended 95 76.61 29 23.4 Defensive
Leasing handling has been suspended 105 83.33 21 16.7 Defensive
Employees have been switched to non-paid holidays 118 85.51 20 14.5 Defensive
Less important production assets have been sold 109 89.34 13 10.7 Defensive
Additional working capital loan has been taken out 124 90.51 13 9.5 Proactive
Business profile of the enterprise has been changed 128 92.75 10 7.2 Proactive
Real estate has been sold (are sold) 114 98.28 2 1.7 Defensive
Source: Authors’ own study.
A significant percentage of businesses switched employees to paid holidays 
(49.7%), stopped paying bonuses (42.1%) and extended payment terms of liabilities 
(41%). Between 20% to 30% of surveyed businesses implemented e-commerce, 
engaged in social activities connected with prevention of COVID-19, liquidated less 
profitable areas and reduced wages. Less than 20% of family business suspended 
repayment of loans or/and leasing, switched employees to non-paid holidays, sold 
part of their production assets (less significant) or/and real estate, took out working 
capital loans and changed their business profile (see Table 4).
In the subsequent stage of analyses we calculated the probability of family busi-
ness survival during the COVID-19 pandemic. Respondents were asked to assess 
the likelihood of survival on a Likert scale (1 – it is certain that the business will 
collapse, 10 – it is certain that the business will survive). Next, this scale was recal-
culated to intervals of 0 to 100% through implementation of the zero unitarisation 
method (Kukuła, 1999). Figures showed that the average likelihood of survival for 
surveyed business entities was 74.4% (SD 23.1%). Divergences in the probability 
of survival were not confirmed statistically if legal forms and sectors were taken 
into consideration, according to the Kruskal–Wallis test p = 0.701 and p = 0.562, 
respectively. Similarly, U Mann–Whitney tests did not confirm differences between 
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family businesses that were managed (p = 0.054) and owned (p = 0.95) only by first 
generation (generation of founders) and future generations of the family. 
Subsequently, we conducted a more profound study that was focused on answer-
ing research question 3. With more profound analyses we isolated the probability of 
survival if a particular solution was implemented or not. We analysed separately the 
likelihood of the family business surviving for each kind of measure (reaction) that 
was or was not implemented. The differences between these were tested by using 
the U Mann–Whitney test. Detailed results were presented in Table 5. Additionally, 
we marked measures (reactions) in accordance with the divisions presented in Fig-
ure 2. Generally, with the exception of switching employees to remote work, in all 
other cases the likelihood of survival was perceived lower by family businesses that 
undertook particular activities. Additionally, in 11 out of 17 analyses the differences 
were statistically significant.
In the case of such activities as switching employees to remote work, engaging 
in social activities, taking out additional working capital loans, switching employees 
to paid holidays and implementation of e-commerce trade undertaken by the family 
firm, the probability of survival on average was around 70%. Additionally, four out 
of five measures were classified as “proactive” (one was neutral). 
For the next group of activities implemented by family businesses, the probabil-
ity of survival was in the range of 60% to 70% (tapping liquid financial “reserves”, 
suspending investments, stopping bonus payments, liquidating less profitable areas 
of business interest, extending payment terms of liabilities, switching employees to 
nonpaid holidays, changing the business profile and reducing wages). This group 
encompasses all kinds of reactions: proactive (1) proactive/neutral (2), neutral (3) 
and defensive (4) (see Table 5).
The last group of reactions encompasses those family firms for whom proba-
bility of survival was below 60% (suspending leasing payments, suspending loan 
repayments, selling nonessential production assets and real estate). All of these were 
deemed to be defensive. More profound analyses devoted to these ad hoc reactions 
were presented in the section “Discussions and conclusions”.
It should also be noted that the Polish government introduced on 31 March the 
Anti-Crisis Shield 1.0 and a few weeks later the Anti-Crisis Shield 2.0 with the 
assumption that this action would mitigate the negative consequences of the crisis. 
The most important aspects of these shields have been discussed previously in this 
paper. In accordance with our findings, 58.6% of family businesses intended to use 
or did use proposed solutions, 23% were considering whether to use them and 24.4% 
were not interested in applying these or were “outsiders” (meaning that they did not 
fulfil the formal requirements for accessing these instruments). Additionally, we 
asked to what extent the shield will mitigate the negative effects of the crisis. For 
69.8% of surveyed family businesses the positive impact of the shield will be fairly 
low. Almost a quarter (23.5%) assessed it as having no influence, and only 6.7% of 
businesses ranked the shield as significant or very significant.
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Discussions and conclusions
A sudden drop in revenue was a common consequence of COVID-19 restrictions 
in the Polish economy. All accessible reports on the financial health of business en-
tities presented consistent figures. In a survey conducted in April 2020, almost 94% 
of businesses were expecting decreases in revenue, and the drop would be nearly 
50%. Similar figures were presented by PWC (Forbes, 2020; PWC, 2020). The same 
negative effects were observed in employment. Reduction was predicted to reach 
15.5% in the first phase of the crisis (Forbes, 2020), with the steepest drop being in 
a group of microbusinesses (16.6%). In this context, our findings are in line with the 
figures in question (see Table 2). More importantly, the majority of surveyed family 
businesses first declared that they have avoided and would continue to avoid laying off 
employees (73% and 67%, respectively). This observation confirms previous findings 
that family businesses try to be “good employers”, and to some extent do care about 
their staff (Arregle, Hitt, Sirmon, & Very, 2007; Neckebrouck, Schulze, & Zellweger, 
2018) even when facing temporary market downturns (Lee, 2006). If the family firm 
declared a reduction in employment (more than 27% of businesses), the average was 
15.7%, and surveyed businesses that were expecting a further drop in employment 
were at 13.1%. Considering these figures, it can be said that the lockdown due to the 
COVID-19 pandemic adversely affected the economic well-being of family firms.
To prevent the negative effects of the COVID-19 crisis, surveyed family busi-
nesses took several ad hoc measures (reactions). The frequency of the implementa-
tion of these measures is the answer to the second research question in this paper. It 
was found that family businesses’ reactions were frequently neutral and proactive/
neutral (except in the case of liquid financial “reserves” having been tapped). Other 
measures that were implemented by a lower percentage of businesses did not present 
with any consistency.
Moreover, we found that some of these actions by family firms depended on 
general perceptions of their future business longevity reflected by their probability 
of survival during the COVID-19 crisis. These findings answered the third research 
question. We then divided analysed reactions into three groups (proactive, neutral 
and progressive – see Tables 4 and 5). 
It should be noted that for “proactive” solutions, the average probability of sur-
vival declared by the family businesses was relatively higher (except in the case of 
changing the profile of the enterprise) compared to other actions/solutions. Moreover, 
differences between entities which introduced a proactive solution and those that 
did not, in most cases, were insignificant (except in the implementation of e-com-
merce trade). It may suggest that family firms’ anticipation of the adverse effects 
of COVID-19 crisis did not influence the decision of whether or not to implement 
this solution. 
For “neutral” reactions, the probability of survival occurred on average lower 
compared to “proactive” actions, and we isolated statistically significant differences 
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between family firms which implemented these solutions and those that did not. This 
leads to the conclusion that “neutral” actions are undertaken first if the business 
entity is facing potential negative effects of the crisis. It should be noted that neutral 
solutions can be implemented in line with formal legal requirements with no severe 
harm to stakeholders. It means that these solutions are chosen if the company is 
anticipating a negative (however moderate) impact of the crisis.
Majority of “defensive” solutions differ statistically between family businesses 
that introduced or not them. The probability of survival for family firms that imple-
mented these defensive solutions was noticeably lower compared to other groups 
of solutions (proactive and neutral). These findings can mean that family businesses 
which undertake these defensive actions faced the most challenges from the COV-
ID-19 crisis and tried to maintain the business using methods that could mitigate neg-
ative effects in the short term. These actions are typically connected with reduction 
of financial and economic burdens of the business (e.g., suspension of payments).
Analyses of the specificity of particular reactions led us to conclude that each 
of these reactions can be attributed to three or four of the strategic crisis responses 
proposed by Wenzel et al. (2020). “Proactive” responses usually mean innovative 
approaches; “neutral” reactions are associated with mere perseverance and “defen-
sive” refers to retrenchment. We cannot classify at least one of our ad hoc reactions 
to an exit strategic approach presented in the work in question. Similar results were 
presented by Kraus and co-workers who after analysing businesses entities in five 
European countries (Austria, Germany, Italy, Liechtenstein, Switzerland) also de-
tected business decisions that could be construed as exit strategic approaches (Kraus 
et al., 2020). This may suggest that the first thought of business managers is how to 
survive a crisis: in other words, what measures should be implemented to alleviate 
the negative consequences of the crisis and how to keep the firm steadily functioning. 
“Exit” seems to be the ultimate strategic decision. It must be stressed that survival in 
this case at least partly affects long-term orientation of family businesses and their 
propensity for over-generational functioning. Unfortunately, in answering the fourth 
research question, as representatives of family businesses indicated, Anti-Crisis 
Shields implemented by the Polish government will be of limited use in helping 
business entities survive during a crisis. 
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